News
Litigation
- [02/06] DEA agents in Puerto Rico claim discrimination
- [02/06] JP Morgan to pay $110M to settle overdraft lawsuit
- [02/06] Smith & Nephew to pay $22.2M in US settlements
- [02/03] World court upholds German immunity in Nazi cases
Real Estate
- [02/06] DDR Launches FranchiseConnect, New Service Connecting Franchise Opportunities and Entrepreneurs
- [02/06] Current Exchange Rates Could Prompt Brits to Purchase Spanish Property, Says Currencies Direct
- [02/03] Chicago Suburban LaGrange Park to Receive Long-Awaited Illinois Grant
- [02/03] Behringer Harvard Breaks Ground for Second Phase of Allegro, a Luxury Multifamily Community in North Dallas
Business
- [02/08] Nokia to end phone assembly in Europe
- [02/08] European agency orders more A380 wing part checks
- [02/08] UK to buy another Boeing C-17 military plane
- [02/08] RBS chief says bonus controversy harmed bank
Case Summaries
Contracts
[02/01]
GECCMC 2005-C1 Plummer Street Office L.P. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
In a suit alleging breach of lease agreements that the defendant bank assumed after it purchased a failed bank's assets and liabilities from the FDIC pursuant to the terms of a written purchase and assumption agreement, the district court's grant of the bank's motion to dismiss is affirmed, where under federal common law, the plaintiff lacked standing to bring suit under the agreement because it was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the agreement.
[01/27]
C9 Ventures v. SVC-West, L.P.
In a personal injury suit in which a lessor of helium-filled tanks used to inflate festive balloons cross-complained against the lessee to enforce an indemnification provision on the back of an unsigned invoice, the trial court's judgment in favor of the lessor and award of attorney fees to it is reversed, where: 1) the lessee did not manifest assent to the terms on the back of the unsigned invoice by course of dealing or course of performance, or under basic contract law; 2) the lessee did not sign the invoice or otherwise expressly agree to its terms; 3) an unsigned invoice itself is not a contract, and repeated delivery of a particular form does not make the form part of the parties' agreement; 4) payment of the invoice merely constituted the lessee's performance of the obligation under the oral contract to pay for the rental of the helium-filled tanks; and 5) assuming the transaction was a sale of goods covered by division 2 of the California Commercial Code, the indemnification provision was not an additional term of the contract under section 2207 of the Commercial Code.
[01/26]
Lopez & Medina Corp. v. Marsh USA, Inc.
On appeal of a rejected cross-motion for summary judgment that argued that an insurance policy's coverage expressly applied to an airline's underlying claims for damages arising from the insured's failure to provide air transportation, as contractually required, to the airline's passengers, the district court's order denying the motion is affirmed, as the phrase "legally obligated to pay as damages" in a commercial general liability policy, which usually covers only tort claims, does not also provide coverage for claims in an underlying action arising out of and related to a contract between the parties.
[01/25]
Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
In a class action complaint predicated on the defendant's practice of purchasing wholesale motor fuel in gallon units at a standardized temperature of 60 degrees Fahrenheit, but selling motor fuel to California consumers at an average temperature of approximately 70 degrees, the trial court's order granting the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is reversed, and its order sustaining the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment and unlawful business practices under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) is affirmed in part and reversed in part, where: 1) the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' UCL and Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) claims pursuant to the judicial abstention doctrine; 2) the plaintiffs had standing to assert, and the complaint stated a cause of action for, violation of the UCL and CLRA; 3) the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for breach of contract; and 4) the trial court did not err in sustaining the defendant’s demurrer to the plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim.
[01/24]
In the Matter of Thorpe Insulation Co.
In a bankruptcy case in which several insurance companies that did not reach settlements with the debtors were not allowed to challenge the Chapter 11 reorganization plan, the district court order issuing and affirming the plan is reversed with instructions on remand, where: 1) the appeal was not equitably moot; 2) the appellants met statutory, constitutional, and prudential standing requirements; 3) the appellants had standing in bankruptcy court to object to confirmation of the plan; and 4) anti-assignment provisions contained in contracts between the appellants and debtors were preempted by federal bankruptcy law.
Commercial Law
[02/01]
In re American Express Merchants' Litigation
In a class action asserting Sherman Act claims, brought against a charge card issuer whose card acceptance agreement purported to preclude a merchant from bringing a class action lawsuit, the district court's grant of the defendant's motion to compel arbitration and dismissal of the case is reversed, where the cost of plaintiffs' individually arbitrating their dispute with the defendant would be prohibitive, effectively depriving them of the statutory protections of the antitrust laws, and thus the class action waiver in the arbitration provision was unenforceable.
[01/27]
C9 Ventures v. SVC-West, L.P.
In a personal injury suit in which a lessor of helium-filled tanks used to inflate festive balloons cross-complained against the lessee to enforce an indemnification provision on the back of an unsigned invoice, the trial court's judgment in favor of the lessor and award of attorney fees to it is reversed, where: 1) the lessee did not manifest assent to the terms on the back of the unsigned invoice by course of dealing or course of performance, or under basic contract law; 2) the lessee did not sign the invoice or otherwise expressly agree to its terms; 3) an unsigned invoice itself is not a contract, and repeated delivery of a particular form does not make the form part of the parties' agreement; 4) payment of the invoice merely constituted the lessee's performance of the obligation under the oral contract to pay for the rental of the helium-filled tanks; and 5) assuming the transaction was a sale of goods covered by division 2 of the California Commercial Code, the indemnification provision was not an additional term of the contract under section 2207 of the Commercial Code.
[01/24]
Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A. Inc.
In a putative class action against a men's clothing retailer alleging that its printing of “EXPIRY: 04/##” on a credit card receipt willfully violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA)'s prohibition against printing the expiration date of the a credit card upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale, the district court's grant of the defendant's motion to dismiss is affirmed, where: 1) FACTA prohibits a merchant from printing expiration date information on a receipt provided to the consumer, even if the year is redacted; but 2) the defendant's interpretation of FACTA, although erroneous, was at least objectively reasonable, and thus there was no "willful" violation that could support a claim.
[01/24]
Mabey Bridge & Shore, Inc. v. Schoch
In a suit by a corporation engaged in the business of supplying temporary steel bridges for construction projects, seeking a declaration that the Pennsylvania Steel Products Procurement Act, as interpreted and enforced by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), is unconstitutional, and requesting a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining PennDOT from prohibiting the use of the company's temporary bridges on its projects, the district court's grant of summary judgment against the company on all its claims is affirmed, where: 1) the state Steel Act was not preempted by the federal Buy America Act and related federal regulations; 2) the Steel Act is not unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause; 3) PennDOT's actions did not violate the Contract Clause; and 4) PennDOT's application of the Steel Act did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
[01/20]
Khan v. Dell Inc.
On a motion to compel arbitration brought by a defendant computer manufacturer in a case alleging design defects brought as a putative consumer class action by a purchaser, the district court's judgment denying the motion is vacated and the case remanded, where: 1) the arbitration agreement in the purchase contract did not indicate the parties' unambiguous intent not to arbitrate their disputes if the named arbitrator was unavailable; and 2) Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act requires a court to address such unavailability by appointing a substitute arbitrator.
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